Federalist Paper #41

     There are 2 ways to examine the Constitution: the amount of power, and how that power is distributed. In deciding how much power the federal government should have it must be decided if any of the powers are unnecessary or improper and whether these powers threaten the sovereignty left to the states. Is the power necessary for the public good? If so, how best can we guard against that power being used against the public good? Madison goes into detail describing that security against foreign danger is one of the most basic, essential goals along with the power to collect and borrow money to provide those securities. Opponents to the power "to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts, and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States" feared unlimited permission to the government. (Even though it appears that today those opponents may have been correct, it must be remembered that it was NOT the original intent of the Constitution nor the founders that wrote it.) In defense of the "to raise money for the general welfare" clause Madison argues that the opponents' fear of interpreting such a phrase in ridiculous ways (which I think has been done) is basically silly. Madison's final sentence: "How difficult it is for error to escape its own condemnation." is in the process of coming true, but hopefully it is not too late.